Guatemala's Tug of War: The Struggle for Democracy Amidst Corruption
Harassment, imprisonment, and exile were the norm for many who spoke up against former Guatemalan President Alejandro Giammattei and his Vamos party. During his four-year presidency, journalists, judicial officials, and rival politicians found themselves in a losing battle against Giammettei’s march to authoritarianism. The former president’s administration reversed a series of anti-corruption measures enacted in the last twenty years and launched a campaign of politically motivated lawsuits against opponents.
Despite these unprecedented attempts to sabotage opposition, Bernardo Arévalo, a sociologist turned political reformer, managed to win the Guatemalan presidential election last August. He was officially sworn in as president on January 14 after an hours-long attempt by the Vamos party to derail his inauguration. However, the Vamos party’s hold on significant systemic power will likely frustrate the new president’s ambitions to combat corruption.
Guatemala has struggled to rebuild its institutions in the aftermath of a 36-year civil war that was triggered by the U.S.-backed overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz’s democratic government in 1954. The resulting lack of institutional durability facilitated Giammattei’s consolidation of power from 2019-2023. In particular, underhanded ties between Vamos party politicians, judicial figures, business leaders, and military officials served to undermine democracy and accelerate the country’s backsliding during his administration. This web of powerful actors, which took form during the civil war, is often referred to as the “Pact of the Corrupt” by the Guatemalan public and media.
One such pact-holder is former President Giammattei’s Attorney General María Porras, whom he reappointed in 2022. According to the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), Porras purged the government of pro-democracy politicians and dubiously prosecuted government critics. The OCCRP even named her the “2023 Person of the Year in Organized Crime and Corruption.” Despite numerous corruption allegations and a spot on the U.S.'s list of corrupt leaders, Porras remains in her position until 2026.
She is kicking off the new year by attempting to thwart the peaceful transition of power to Arévalo through frivolous lawsuits. The newly inaugurated president has requested her resignation as attorney general but to no avail. If Porras continues to hold her post, Arévalo and his administration will likely find it difficult to investigate cases of corruption without facing legal or political consequences. For example, Porras has stalled anti-corruption efforts in the past by claiming that prosecutors were themselves engaged in corruption or were “mishandling” cases. In 2020 she approved several unfounded complaints against the head of the Special Prosecutor’s Office Against Impunity (FECI) and opened investigations into his handling of corruption cases, limiting the office’s ability to function.
Attorney General María Porras shakes hands with former President Alejandro Giammattei.
In addition to Porras, Giammattei also appointed loyal staff and magistrates to the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) who are, in reality, an extension of his political party. As Central American analyst Pamela Ruiz describes, incumbents use the judicial system to “bar politicians who could threaten their interests from running for high office.” True to form, in 2022 and 2023 judges appointed by Giammattei’s government promptly disqualified four prominent politicians from running for office. Notably, his government’s efforts to prosecute and electorally disqualify Arévalo were unsuccessful because they were unable to bypass his legal impunity.
Still, in accordance with the Guatemalan constitution, the SCJ magistrates appointed under Vamos's control will remain in power until their four-year terms are up. When those terms expire in 2026, new candidates will be chosen via commissions of appellate judges and other law professionals. Given the Vamos party’s tight hold on the judicial branch, newly elected judges will likely continue to favor Giammattei and his allies.
Judicial tactics employed by Giammattei and the Vamos party have parallelled Daniel Ortega’s path to authoritarianism in Nicaragua, where Ortega and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) accumulated power by controlling the reigns of the judiciary. Institutions heavily packed by Ortega and his loyalists allowed him almost complete control over the political landscape, culminating in his request for Congress to allow multiple presidential terms, which the courts later upheld as constitutional.
Political compromising of the judiciary, as Nicaragua’s experience exemplifies, is a dangerous threat to democracy. For Guatemala, the severity of this threat will depend on the extent to which Vamos and Giammattei can continue to control the court system behind Arévalo’s back. Even if Vamos somehow blunders their legal stronghold, judicial pushback will represent a challenge to Arévalo and the Semilla party he represents.
Beyond the legal realm, corruption can also be caused by dubious ties between business elites and politicians. In Nicaragua, Ortega and FSLN’s relationship with the private petroleum company Albanisa, a processor of Venezuelan oil, helped to solidify authoritarian control. Ortega’s government allegedly embezzled millions of dollars through Albanisa and used the funds for state purposes.
Big business has also been a factor in systemic corruption for Guatemala, albeit in a different fashion. Since the end of the civil war, government officials have illegally excluded select corporations from tax duties in exchange for bribes or other forms of support. For example, in a corruption scandal nicknamed “La Línea,” a group of officials in Guatemala's state customs office covertly lowered import taxes in exchange for over $300,000 a week.
The La Línea scandal was uncovered by the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) in 2014 and resulted in numerous arrests, including the president and vice president at the time. An organization formed between the United Nations (UN) and Guatemala in 2007, CICIG’s primary objective was to assist in the investigation and prosecution of corrupt officials. From its inception until 2019, the organization worked with the attorney general’s office to expose 1,540 people guilty of corruption in Guatemala. However, former President Jimmy Morales, following CICIG investigations regarding alleged campaign finance violations, terminated the country’s agreement with the UN in 2019 and ended the commission’s anti-corruption campaign. The CICIG was an important asset for hopeful reformers. With it gone, Arévalo will have fewer tools at his disposal to address corruption.
Consolidation under the former president has not evaporated with the recent transfer of power. While Vamos was unable to prevent Arévalo’s election, the party did well in the general Congressional elections. In 2024, despite a low public approval rating of 19%, Giammattei’s Vamos party had 39 of the 160 seats in Congress, many more than the 23 won by Arévalo’s Semilla party.
Congressional electoral success in Guatemala is often influenced by the candidates’ access to pieces of the economic pie. If a candidate already has established relationships with economic elites–who favor Vamos and other conservative parties for tax reasons–they are more able to effectively campaign or, in a clientelistic fashion, buy votes. In any case, opposition control of Congress is yet another limiting factor for President Arévalo. This was made clear when just one week after the Semilla party and Arévalo were sworn in, Guatemala’s Constitutional Court barred Semilla party members from assuming positions in the Congressional Board of Directors in January 2024.
Supporters of Bernardo Arévalo protest the suspension of the Semilla party in September.
Given the constraints on President Arévalo’s ability to pursue his political agenda, Guatemala’s democracy remains in limbo. If Vamos can maintain its grasp on key institutions, Arévalo will likely leave office with little democratic reform to celebrate. On the other hand, President Arévalo and the Semilla party are more popular among an electorate that is increasingly fed up with rampant corruption and financial misuse. The new president’s surprise win has contributed to growing political optimism, especially among Guatemalan youth and indigenous groups. If Giammattei, Porras, and the Vamos party continue to target Arévalo on meritless grounds, this could potentially hurt their chances in the long run and only add fuel to the fire. With that said, these next four years will be vital for the future of Guatemalan democracy and for the country’s development as a whole.
Guatemalan President Bernardo Arévalo with supporters during a rally in June.